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A critical glance at the literature review of GCC countries, firm performance and 
firm value shows that the literature does not adequately consider the uniqueness of an 
institutional setting such as the presence of royal family members and government 
officials’ members on the board. Additionally, noticeable features are not accounted for 
in the previous literature, such as a large involvement of relatives and the presence of a 
female on the board of directors. It is important to understand whether these variables 
matter or not in this region as this then influences the firm’s performance and firm 
value. Thus, this study focuses on the effect of internal CG of the firm’s performance 
and firm value in five GCC countries. The final sample consists of 220 firms (1,096 
firm-year observations) for the fiscal year 2009 to 2013. The main finding is that there 
is a positive significant relationship is seen between expertise factors and firm perfor-
mance. The expertise factor encompasses royal family members on the board as well 
as hiring one of the Big 4-auditing firms. This result is in line with a theoretical claim 
(agency theory), the research question expectation and empirical evidence.
Keywords: royal family, board of directors, corporate governance, firm performance
1. Introduction
There is agreement among scholars with regard to the limitation of CG research 
or studies in emerging markets. According to Nenova [1], CG in the developing 
countries is suffering from the effects of a number of issues including transferring the 
value from minority to controlling shareholders, a poor legal system, the problem of 
auditing practice and non-transparency disclosure. A critical glance at the literature 
review of GCC countries, firm performance and firm value shows that the literature 
does not adequately consider the uniqueness of an institutional setting such as the 
presence of royal family members and government officials’ members on the board. 
Additionally, noticeable features are not accounted for in the previous literature, such 
as a large involvement of relatives and the presence of a female on the board of direc-
tors. It is important to understand whether these variables matter or not in this region 
as this then influences the firm’s performance and firm value. In addition, this question 
considers some features of an audit committee and their effect on a firm’s performance 
and firm value. An audit committee is an important committee within the board com-
mittee. An audit committee is not just for supporting management by giving advice for 
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major business decisions but also for monitoring and overseeing the management to 
protect shareholders’ interests and to provide an independent view of corporate execu-
tives and their affairs [2]. It has been argued that an audit committee is more beneficial 
due to its skills and resources, which in turn affects their ability to enhance EQ, firm 
performance and firm value [3]. With respect to females and relatives, it is interesting 
to note that the region is considered a collectivistic under Hofstadte’s cultural dimen-
sions. Due to the culture and social norms, there is a fear of involving females on the 
board [4]. However, lately, females further engagement in the economy has grown [5]. 
In addition, as family ownership prevails in the region, there is a substantial involve-
ment of relatives, which cannot be ignored [4]. Finally, the rationale of using both firm 
performance and firm value in the paper is that firm performance measurements (ROA 
and ROE) reflect performance based on historical information. This reflects previous 
firms’ operation, and the efficiency of the firm using equity funds to generate profits 
[6, 7] where the firm value measurements (Tobin’s Q) show performance based on 
firm value by market evolution of the assets [8], which in turn reflects current action 
[9]. In other words, firm value measurements indicate the perception of the market 
with respect to the firm’s performance [10]. It also refers to growth and investment 
opportunities [11]. Firm value measurement also accounts for risk and is less likely to 
be manipulated as accounting measures [12]. Thus, it helps investors to estimate the 
growth and risk potential and shows the size of the firm. Management and investors 
have different interests and ways to evaluate CG; therefore, management attempt to use 
firm performance measurement (ROA and ROE) as the measurement to show how the 
wealth affects CG mechanisms. On the other hand, investors seem to prefer to value the 
firm structure of CG based on firm value measurement (Tobin’s Q) [13].
2. GCC countries background
A brief background of GCC countries is needed to have some understanding 
of the institutional setting. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, was 
founded in 1981 and consists of six Arab states namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia (SA), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), all of which are 
Gulf Monarchies. GCC countries are located in the Middle East. Specifically, 
Arabian Peninsula and their total population are 50.1 million people [14]. They also 
share similar Arabian culture and traditions, the faith of Islam, social structures, 
wealth, political development (Monarchy), and demography [15]. The primary 
purpose of the establishment of GCC was to enhance the cooperation and inte-
gration as well as to strengthen their economy and development through their 
participation in different fields such as the economy, financial affairs, education, 
cultural activities, social, medical, agricultural development, research development 
and joint projects. Between them, they can issue similar policies and regulation to 
achieve unity [16]. It is also worth mentioning that each country has an independent 
government and their own independent currencies.
GCC countries are developing countries in Asia but enjoy prosperity due to natu-
ral resources and the rapid development of their capital market [17]. Some features 
make GCC countries interesting when examining the effect of CG on EQ, firm per-
formance and firm value. Recently, the GCC countries share in the world’s GDP has 
doubled to 2.2 percent, which refer to the development of a dynamic economy [18]. 
This also increases the significance and importance of GCC countries in the global 
economy [19]. Additionally, they have followed some global norms and standards 
to work with international organisations. This engagement with the world raises the 
status of the region, which brings more benefit and increases regarding trade and 
investment. This marks the region as “one of the most prosperous in the world” [19].
3




Agency theory focuses on the relationship between the principals (owners) 
and the agents (managers). Agency theory’s justification for its existence is to 
establish appropriate and adequate incentives in order to eliminate opportunis-
tic behaviours by the company’s management and to ensure that they pursue 
and maximise not only the company’s wealth and interests but, also, work on 
behalf of the company’s shareholders [20]. From agency theory’s perspective, 
a reduced agency problem leads to maximising the company’s value and the 
returns on investments to its shareholders. Furthermore, agency theory suggests 
ways of reducing agency costs in order to increase the company’s EQ. These are: 
namely, monitoring costs; bonding costs; and residual losses which stem from 
the company’s internal CG structure [21, 22]. Monitoring costs are borne by the 
principals and are the basis of the company’s monitoring mechanisms, such as 
internal CG mechanisms, which are used to monitor management behaviour. 
Bonding costs relate to the financial or non-financial mechanisms which are 
used to ensure the agents make an effort to maximise the principals’ wealth. 
Residual losses happen despite the involvement of monitoring cost and bonding 
cost because either these can fail or be insufficiently effective to align the princi-
pals’ (owners) interests with those of the agents (management). Consequently, 
the owners can reduce the incentives to look after themselves by using some 
tools such as monitoring managers’ behaviours and by introducing a contract 
which provides an incentive to align their interests with those of the company’s 
management [21, 23].
4. Literature review
4.1 Independence factor, firm performance, and firm value
The independent factor includes independent directors on the board of directors 
and audit committee. Arguably, a high percentage of independent directors on the 
board of directors and audit committee influence firm performance positively due 
to their effective monitoring [24]. However, others argue that independent directors 
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in emerging countries are not applicable as it is “symbolic” but they are more likely 
to follow the management [15, 25, 26]. Nevertheless, the study follows the notion 
of CG code in the international practice and GCC countries and the majority of 
findings [27, 28] and hypothesises that:
H01: There is a positive association between independence factor, firm performance 
and firm value.
4.2 Family factor, firm performance and firm value
Family factor encompasses family ownership and relatives on the board. Based 
on a prior discussion on relatives and family ownership, the research argues that 
these two variables are prevalent in the emerging markets [29] to protect family 
wealth and power [30], which in turn, lead to better performance [31–33]. Thus, 
they would play an effective role in the company, which results in better financial 
performance. Accordingly, the research hypothesises that:
H02: There is a positive association between family factor, firm performance and 
firm value.
4.3 Board factor, firm performance and firm value
Board factor contains board size, board meetings, audit committee size and audit 
committee meetings. Referring back to discussed literature of board size, meetings, 
audit committee size and meetings; even though there are few negative findings in 
the literature, the majority of prior studies argue that a large board and audit com-
mittee and the high frequency of board and audit committee meetings leads to better 
firm performance and firm value. Accordingly, despite different findings, the study 
follows the majority of prior studies’ findings, the recommendation of CG code and 
claims that the board factor leads to high firm performance and hypothesises that:
H03: There is a positive association between board factor, firm performance and 
firm value.
4.4 Government factor, firm performance and firm value
Government factor encompasses government ownership and government offi-
cials on the board. Based on the prior discussion on these two variables, the research 
argues that the involvement of these two groups is common in the emerging markets 
[29] to retain their power on the firms. Thus, they may not play an effective role in 
the company, which results in poor performance. Accordingly, the study follows the 
majority of the studies [34–37] and hypothesises that:
H04: There is a negative association between government factor, firm performance 
and firm value.
4.5 Effectiveness factor, firm performance and firm value
The researcher had difficulty giving a name to this factor initially. However, 
other researchers such as Larcker et al., [38] mention the difficulties in assigning a 
name to some factors. This factor captures institutional ownership and audit com-
mittee expertise and the study calls them effectiveness because both are expected to 
5
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have effective monitoring. Based on a literature review of institutional ownership 
and an audit committee, despite some negative findings, the majority of the studies’ 
findings concludes that institutional ownership [39] and audit committee expertise 
[40, 41] lead to better firm performance and firm value. Therefore, the research 
follows these studies and hypothesises that:
H05: There is a positive association between effectiveness factor, firm performance 
and firm value.
4.6 Expertise factor, firm performance and firm value
Expertise factor includes royal family members on the board and Big4 audit 
firms. Based on the discussion of royal family members and Big4 firms literature, 
the study argues that by giving the royal family members legitimacy, privileges and 
status, their involvement has benefits for the firms and their shareholders which 
result in better firm financial performance [42–47]. Additionally, despite the mixed 
results in the literature of Big4 firms, the majority of the studies [48–52] conclude 
that Big4 firms increase firm performance and firm value. Accordingly, the research 
hypothesises that:
H06: There is a positive association between legitimacy factor, firm performance 
and firm value.
4.7 Board composition factor, firm performance and firm value
Board composition factor captures females on the board and CEO duality. Halawi 
& Davidson [4] document a low female involvement on boards, around 1.5% in the 
GCC. Accordingly, the research argues that since there are few female directors on 
the board and because of the culture in emerging markets, it is likely they have a 
lack of qualifications, skills and business expertise needed for directorship, which 
might negatively influence firm performance and firm value [5, 53–56]. With regard 
to CEO duality, the code of GCC countries and best practice requires separation 
between the two roles. In addition, this study follows the majority of literature, 
which finds a negative association between CEO duality and firm performance  
[28, 57, 58]. Therefore, the study hypothesises that:
H07: There is a negative association between board composition factor, firm perfor-
mance and firm value.
5. Methodology
5.1 Measurement of firm’s performance and firm value
Regarding the evolution of firm performance and firm value, there is no consen-
sus within the literature [57]. Nevertheless, the majority of prior studies have relied 
on return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) which are an accounting-
based measure and a measure of profitability [59, 60] and Tobin’s Q which is 
market-based measure [13, 61–64]. ROA shows performance based on historical 
information, which reflects previous firms’ operation, where ROE reflects the 
efficiency of the firm using equity funds to generate profits [6, 7]. Moreover, Tobin’s 
Q shows performance based on firm value by the market evolution of the assets [8], 
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which in turn reflects current action [9]. It also refers to growth and investment 
opportunities [11]. Tobin’s Q accounts for risk and is less likely for manipulation of 
accounting measures [12]. Management and investors have different interests and 
ways to evaluate CG; therefore, management attempt to use ROA and ROE as the 
measurement to show how the wealth affects CG mechanisms. On the other hand, 
investors seem to prefer to value the firm structure of CG based on Tobin’s Q and 
measurement [13]. Therefore, a higher ratio represents a higher return in each of 
these measurements.
Some studies of CG have used ROA and ROE as a measurement method (as 
the proxy of financial performance) [57, 65–67]. Tobin’s Q is the measure used to 
reflect how management effectively manages assets to generate value for its share-
holders and reflects the perception of a firm’s financial performance by market 
[57]. Chung & Pruitt [68] asserts that Tobin’s Q has great theoretical and practical 
relevance. It has been widely used in CG literature as the proxy for firm perfor-
mance [61, 62, 65]. Following previous paper the author control a couple of vari-
ables as influence the analysis. These variables growth Copeland & Dolgoff [69], 
leverage Haniffa & Hudaib [57], Jang & Park [70], firm size performance [71, 72] 
and big 4 Al-Hussaini & Al-Sultan, [73] and Wang & Huang [74]. The investiga-
tion of the effect of CG on firm performance and firm value based on the principal 
component analysis (PCA).
5.2 Principal component analysis (PCA)
It uses the three sets of internal CG mechanisms namely: ownership structure, 
the board of directors and audit committee. Due to a large number of variables and 
the nature of CG mechanisms (variables) especially the board of directors’ composi-
tion, these variables correlated with each other. Not all 16 variables of CG can be 
included in one regression without facing the econometric problem, which leads to 
difficult interpretation and involvement of measurement error. The study does not 
use the CG index as suggested by Larcker et al., [38]. Larcker et al., [38] argues that 
using CG index leads to many econometric problems. Therefore, to alleviate the 
measurement error and avoid multicollinearity, the principal component analysis 
(PCA) has been used which is a data reduction method to extract the relevant factor 
which is used in regression methodology to analyse the data. This method reduces 
the data set to a better size while continuing to hold on to the original information. 
PCA is identifying a parsimonious set of CG variables that affect firm performance 
and firm value.
6. Regression
Firm performance and firm value are a dependent variable to the explanatory 
variables, which include individual internal CG factors and control variables. 
Table 1 summarises the CG factor and control variables investigated in this 
question, which include the definition of each variable and shows how they were 
measured.
Y = α + β1 F1 (INDEPENDENCit) + β2 F2 (FAMILY it) + β3 F3 (BOARDit) + β4 F4 
(GOVERNMENT it) + β5 F5 (EFFECTIVENESS it) + β6 F6 (EXPERTISE it) + β7 
F7 (BOARD COMPOSITION it) + β8 LN_GROWTH it + β9 LN_LEVERAGEit + + 
β10 LN_SIZEit + εit.
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Coefficients predict that β1 will have positive value where β2 will have negative 
value. Expected to is that β3 has a positive influence on firm performance where 
β4 has a negative association with firm performance. Predictions are that β5 and 
β6 will have a positive value where β7 will take a negative value. Regarding control 
variables, predictions are that β8 will also have a positive influence on firm perfor-
mance while β9 will have negative value. Finally, β10 will have a positive value.
Symbol Name of variable Predicted sign
Dependent variable
Firm performance LN_ROA The natural logarithm of Return on assets
LN_ROE The natural logarithm of Return on equity
Firm value LN_TOBIN’S Q The natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q
Independent variable
F1 (INDEPENDENCE) IND Independent directors on the 
board
+
AUDITIND Independence of audit 
committee member
F2 (FAMILY) FAMC Family ownership +
RELATIVE Relatives on the board
F3 (BOARD) BSIZE Board size +
BMEET Board meetings
AUDITSIZE Audit committee size
AUDITMEET Audit committee meetings
F4 (GOVERNMENT) STATC State ownership —
GOV Government officials on the 
board
F5 (EFFECTIVENESS) INSTITIC Institutional ownership +
AUDITEX Audit committee expertise
F6 (EXPERTISE) ROYAL Royal family member on the 
board
+
BIG 4 Big 4 audit firms
F7(BOARD COMPOSITION) FEMALE Female directors on the board +
CEOD CEO duality
Control variables
LN_GROWTH The natural logarithm of Firm growth
LN_LEVERAGE The natural logarithm of Leverage —
LN_SIZE The natural logarithm of the Firm size
BIG 4 Big 4 audit firms
COUNTRY Country dummy ?
INDUSTRY Industry dummy ?
YEAR Year dummy ?
Table 1. 
Variables definition of model: CG, firm performance and firm value.
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7. Results and analysis
7.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the main model variables1. These 
preliminary findings show the relationship between firm performance, firm 
value, ownership structure and CG. The ownership structure shows that 14 
percent of shares are family owned (FOC), whereas governments own 13.8 
percent of shares (STATC). Approximately 21.4 percent of shares are retained 
by institutional investors (INSTITC), and this indicates a high percentage of 
institutional ownership in the region. On average, the board of directors is 
composed of eight members (BSIZE). In addition, there is a small representation 
of females (FEMALE) on the board of approximately 0.2 percent. Not surpris-
ingly, (RELATIVES) relatives represent 11.6 percent of the boards in the region. 
Among these members, 59 percent are independent directors (IND). The table 
also reveals that CEO duality (CEOD) is approximately 7.4 percent of sampled 
firms. The average number of board meetings (BMEET) in the financial year is 
six. There are very few royal family members (Royal) and government officials 
(Gov) represented on these boards. This is an average 3 percent and 1.3 percent 
respectively.
With regard to audit committee characteristics, the average size of the com-
mittee is three members (AUDITSIZE); of which 62.8 percent are independent 
(AUDITIND). This committee meets approximately five times per annum 
(AUDITMEET). On average, 28 percent of the audit committees have at least one 
member who possesses financial or accounting expertise (AUDITEX). More than 
half of the companies hire one of the Big4 external auditors (BIG4).
Regarding control variables, on average, the firm size (SIZE) is $12.69 million. 
The mean of Leverage (LEVERAGE) is about 38 percent. The mean of the growth 
(GRWOTH) is 2.9 percent.
The cross-correlation matrix for the variables is reported in Table 32. The 
results show that institutional ownership is indirectly related to firm value. 
Family ownership shows a positive association with firm performance. Board  
size is positively correlated to firm performance. Contrary to the expectation, 
there is a negative correlation between independence of board of directors, inde-
pendence of audit committee members and firm performance and firm value, 
which is also significant. The CEO duality has indirect association with firm per-
formance. The presence of royal family members and government officials has 
a direct correlation with firm performance. Interestingly, the number of board 
meetings is significantly negative with firm performance. All other correlations 
are relatively low indicating no problem of multicollinearity. In addition, all VIF 
(Variance Inflation Factor) are below a reading of 10. This may indicate that 
there is no problem of multicollinearity among the variables. Therefore, this also 
indicates the validity of data [75–77].
1 The descriptive statistics for the main variables (dependent variables, independent variables and 
control variables) is before using principle component analysis (PCA) to have meaningful understanding 
of the data.
2 The correlation matrix for the main variables (dependent variables, independent variables and control 
variables) is before using principle component analysis (PCA) to have meaningful understanding of 
the data.
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7.2 Regression analysis
The regression analysis for the variables is reported in Table 4. A positive 
significant relationship is seen between expertise factors and firm performance 
(LN_ROA; LN_ROE: coefficient = 0.006; 0.007 p-value <5% and 10%,, respec-
tively). The expertise factor encompasses royal family members on the board as 
well as hiring one of the Big 4-auditing firms. This result is in line with a theo-
retical claim (agency theory), the research question expectation and empirical 
evidence. According to Algamdi [78], the presence of ruling family members on a 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
TOBIN’SQ 1.542 1.274 0.951 0.283 4.657
ROA 0.063 0.054 0.073 −0.090 0.264
ROE 0.108 0.099 0.120 −0.197 0.376
FAMC 0.141 0.065 0.190 0 0.991
STATC 0.138 0 0.213 0 0.893
INSTITC 0.214 0.115 0.256 0 1
BSIZE 7.882 8 1.693 4 18
FEMALE 0.002 0 0.023 0 0.571
RELATIVE 0.116 0 0.188 0 1
IND 0.595 0.571 0.270 0 1
CEOD 0.074 0 0.263 0 1
BMEET 5.634 5 2.025 1 19
ROYAL 0.027 0 0.053 0 0.2
GOV 0.013 0 0.041 0 0.285
AUDITSIZE 3.300 3 0.804 0 6
AUDITIND 0.628 0.666 0.342 0 1
AUDITMEET 4.659 4 2.213 0 21
AUDITEX 0.280 0.333 0.098 0 0.5
BIG4 0.610 1 0.487 0 1
LEVERAGE 0.380 0.350 0.222 0.068 0.820
LN_SIZE 12.691 12.609 1.662 10.100 16.078
GROWTH 0.029 0.018 0.145 −0.441 0.458
N = 1,096.
Notes: TOBIN’S Q is market value measure. ROA, is return on assets and ROE is return on equity. FAMC is 
the percentage of family ownership. STATC is the percentage of state ownership. INSTITC is the percentage of 
institutional ownership. BSIZE is board size. FEMALE is the ratio of female to the total board directors. RELATIVE 
is the ratio of relative to the total board of directors. IND is the ratio of independent director to the total board of 
directors. CEOD a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO also serve as Chairman of the board and 
Zero otherwise. BMEET is the number board of meetings per year. ROYAL is the ratio of royal family member to the 
total board of directors. GOV is the ratio of government official to the total directors. AUDITSIZE is the number of 
directors on the audit committee. AUDITIND is the ratio of independent director in audit committee. AUDITMEET 
is the number of audit committee meeting per year. AUDITEX is the ratio of member with financial or accounting 
expertise to the total director. BIG4 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company is audited by 
one of the BIG4 and zero otherwise. LEVEVERGE is total liabilities divided by total assets. LN_SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the total assets. GROWTH is change in net sales divided by total assets.
Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics-CG and firm performance and firm value-GCC countries.
A
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TOBIN’S Q ROA ROE FAMC STATC INSTITC BSIZE FEMALE RELATIVE IND
TOBIN’S Q 1
ROA 0.371* 1
ROE 0.274* 0.798* 1
FAMC 0.056 0.096* 0.137* 1
STATC 0.022 0.038 0.030 −0.287* 1
INSTITC −0.112* −0.043 0.022 −0.213* −0.249* 1
BSIZE −0.048 0.087* 0.075* −0.183* 0.067* −0.127* 1
FEMALE −0.042 0.020 0.000 0.022 0.068* −0.044 0.010 1
RELATIVE 0.052 0.011 0.016 0.378* −0.229* −0.104* −0.096* −0.016 1
IND −0.059* −0.135* −0.067* −0.024 −0.087* 0.168* −0.198* −0.060* −0.078* 1
CEOD −0.004 −0.072* −0.100* 0.051 −0.063* −0.087* 0.034 0.068* 0.076* −0.068*
BMEET −0.042 −0.139* −0.068* −0.067* 0.211* −0.057 0.002 −0.040 −0.007 0.083*
ROYAL −0.045 0.080* 0.066* 0.033 −0.003 −0.055 0.076* −0.020 0.111* −0.108*
GOV −0.019 0.063* 0.120* −0.139* 0.267* −0.008 0.006 0.024 −0.126* 0.019
AUDITSIZE −0.052 −0.048 −0.016 −0.006 0.081* 0.029 0.158* 0.076* −0.044 0.130*
AUDITIND −0.069* −0.154* −0.092* 0.073* −0.123* 0.190* −0.134* −0.064* 0.007 0.681*
AUDITMEET −0.015 −0.053 0.000 −0.047 0.174* −0.078* 0.090* −0.075* −0.021 0.096*
AUDITEX 0.085* −0.003 0.024 −0.022 −0.131* −0.053 −0.056 −0.112* −0.021 0.059*
BIG4 −0.022 0.084* 0.136* −0.093* 0.132* 0.033 0.103* −0.000 −0.071* −0.046
LEVERAGE −0.115* −0.139* 0.105* 0.095* −0.020 0.176* −0.050 −0.038 0.013 0.096*
LN_SIZE −0.013 −0.007 −0.054 −0.076* 0.160* −0.426* 0.279* 0.030 0.065* −0.314*
GROWTH −0.076* 0.175* 0.166* 0.050 −0.060* 0.018 0.005 −0.008 0.022 −0.031
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ROYAL 0.066* −0.033 1
GOV −0.081* 0.088* −0.004 1
AUDITSIZE −0.019 0.157* −0.063* 0.054 1
AUDITIND −0.059* 0.062* −0.035 −0.002 0.102* 1
AUDITMEET −0.020 0.311* −0.077* 0.047 0.253* 0.083* 1
AUDITEX −0.025 −0.083* −0.046 0.118* −0.163* 0.146* 0.187* 1
BIG4 −0.035 −0.007 0.103* 0.092* 0.019 −0.043 0.009 0.107* 1
LEVERAGE −0.101* 0.113* −0.084* 0.042 * 0.111* 0.090* 0.154* −0.007 0.137* 1
LN_SIZE 0.079* 0.053 0.158* 0.065* 0.003 −0.281* 0.078* 0.03 0.068* −0.0304 1
GROWTH −0.038 −0.028 −0.040 −0.006 0.075* −0.055 0.036 −0.005 0.090* 0.117* −0.035 1
Notes: *,** and *** denote significant at10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
TOBIN’S Q is market value measure. ROA is return on assets and ROE is return on equity. FAMC is the percentage of family ownership. STATC is the percentage of state ownership. INSTITC is the 
percentage of institutional ownership. BSIZE is the board size. FEMALE is the ratio of female to the total board directors. RELATIVE is the ratio of relative to the total board of directors. IND is the ratio of 
independent director to the total board of directors. CEOD a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO also serve as Chairman of the board and Zero otherwise. BMEET is the number board 
of meetings per year. ROYAL is the ratio of royal family member to the total board of directors. GOV is the ratio of government official to the total directors. AUDITSIZE is the number of directors on the 
audit committee. AUDITIND is the ratio of independent director in audit committee. AUDITMEET is the number of audit committee meeting per year. AUDITEX is the ratio of member with financial or 
accounting expertise to the total director. BIG4 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company is audited by one of the BIG4 and zero otherwise. LEVEVERGE is calculated as total liabilities 
divided by total assets. LN_SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets. GROWTH is change in net sales divided by total assets.
Table 3. 
Correlation Martrix-CG and firm performance and firm value-GCC countries.
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Expected sign LN_TOBIN’SQ LN_ROA LN_ROE




+ −0.032 −0.001 0
−0.07 0 0
FAMILY FACTOR + −0.04 −0.001 0.007
−0.13 −0.01 −0.01
BOARD FACTOR + −0.059 0.001 0.001
−0.04 0 0












— −0.049 −0.002 −0.001
−0.04 0 0
LN_GROWTH + −0.052 0.013 0.002
−0.27 −0.02 −0.04
LN_LEVERAGE — −0.098 −0.057 0.035
−0.76 −0.05 −0.07















N 408 408 408
Notes: *,** and *** denote significant at10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
LN_TOBIN’S Q is the natural logarithm of market value measure. LN_ROA, is the natural logarithm of return on 
assets and LN_ROE is the natural logarithm of return on equity. INDEPENDENCE FACTOR includes independent 
of the board of directors and independent of the audit committee. FAMILY FACTOR includes family ownership 
and relatives. BOARD FACTOR includes of board size, board meeting, audit committee size and audit committee 
meeting. GOVERNMENT FACTOR includes government ownership and government officials on the board. 
EFFECTIVENESS FACTOR includes audit committee expertise and institutional ownership. EXPERTISE FACTOR 
includes royal family members on the board and Big 4 audit committee. BOARD COMPOSITION FACTOR 
includes CEO duality and female directors on the board. LN_GROWTH is the natural logarithm of change in net 
sales divided by total assets. LN_LEVEVERGE is the natural logarithm of total liabilities divided by total assets. 
LN_SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets.
Table 4. 
GMM regression-CG, firm performance and firm value- model 1-GCC countries.
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board increases firm performance as they may expand the company’s competitive 
environment and therefore, benefit the companies through networking and their 
privileges, leading to better performance. This supports the majority of politically 
connected firms literature [42–47].
In relation to the Big-4, prior studies show a positive relationship between Big-4 
and firm performance. This is particularly the case in weak investor protection 
environments where firms which hire one of the Big-4 audit firms have a better 
performance record [79–82]. This is because Big-4 audit firms are concerned with 
their brand and reputation [83–85]. Another explanation is that royals may use their 
influence or power to secure the expertise of Big 4 audit firms.
With respect to other factors, namely independence factor, family factor, board 
factor, government factor, effectiveness factor, board composition factor and control 
variables (growth, leverage, and firm size), My study fail to find any significance 
between these variables, firm performance and firm value under GMM regression.
My study first conducted OLS regression and panel data regression. Under 
the pool OLS regression of model 1, independence factor shows a negative and 
significant relationship with firm performance while the board factor indicates a 
negative and significant association with firm value. These results are contrary to 
the study expectations and also with agency theory. Government factor shows a 
positive relationship with firm performance and firm value. Expertise factor shows 
a positive association with firm performance. With regard to control variable, 
growth and leverage appear to have a significant association with firm performance 
and firm value. Most of these significant factors disappear with the study’s control 
for endogeneity problem.
7.3 Robustness test
To check the robustness of the results, the study conducts several additional 
tests. First, the study runs regression models using a different measurement of firm 
performance (Adj ROA) and firm value (Adj Tobin’s Q ). The study runs the main 
model again using some additional variables such as period, corruption and minor-
ity shareholders. These results remain unchanged with these variables but period, 
corruption and minority shareholders are not statistically significant with firm 
performance and firm value using the GMM regression approach.
8. Discussion
The study utilises the model that is based on PAC Some point can be highlighted:
The main observations are that the results in the model are inconclusive and 
there needs to be further study in this area. The results reveal that royal family 
members on the board and Big-4 have a positive influence on firm performance and 
firm value. A possible explanation is that under PCA the variance of one variable 
influences another variable. Thus, this observation indicates that the results from 
PCA may not give a clear picture. However, if the expectation of the study does not 
support the finding under the model, the study may tell a more interesting story. 
According to model, CG factor has a similar impact on long term and short term 
firm performance. In addition, royal family influence Big4 audit firms to use their 
expertise to enhance firm performance and firm value.
The independence factor does not have a significant relationship with firm 
performance and firm value, thus, policymakers should strengthen the role of 
independent directors through the improvement and restriction of requirements 
and procedures of nominating independent directors on the board. Independent 
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directors are some of the most important directors on the board as they can be more 
accountable than an executive [86, 87] due to their independent judgement of board 
decisions [88, 89].
9. Conclusion
This chapter present the results and evidence of the effect of CG on a firm’s 
performance and firm value in GCC countries. A critical glance at the literature 
review of GCC countries, firm performance and firm value shows that the literature 
does not adequately consider the uniqueness of an institutional setting such as the 
presence of royal family members and government officials’ members on the board. 
Additionally, noticeable features are not accounted for in the previous literature, 
such as a large involvement of relatives and the presence of a female on the board 
of directors. It is important to understand whether these variables matter or not 
in this region as this then influences the firm’s performance and firm value. Thus, 
this study focuses on the effect of internal CG of the firm’s performance and firm 
value in five GCC countries. The final sample consists of 220 firms (1,096 firm-
year observations) for the fiscal year 2009 to 2013. The main observations are that 
the results of both models are inconclusive and warranting further investigation. 
However, if the study looks at the support of findings under these two models, the 
study may still tell an interesting story. Thus, some corporate governance variables 
have a different effect on firm performance and firm value. Finally, the study offers 
some recommendations to policymakers with regard to independent directors from 
the analysis from the model.
© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
15
The Effect of Internal Corporate Governance of the Firm’s Performance and Firm Value in Five...
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.99909
[1] Nenova, T. (2003). The Value of 
Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A 
Cross- Country Analysis. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 68(3), 325-351.
[2] Harrison, J. R. (1987). The strategic 
use of corporate board committees. 
California Management Review, 30(1), 
109-125.
[3] Ismail, W., Adibah, W., Van Zijl, T., & 
Dunstan, K. (2010). Earnings quality and 
the adoption of IFRSbased accounting 
standards: Evidence from an emerging 
market. Available at SSRN 1566634
[4] Halawi, A., & Davidson, B. (2008). 
Power Matters: A Survey of GCC 
Boards. National Investor, Investment 
Research.
[5] Terjesen, S., Sealy, R., & Singh, V. 
(2009). Women directors on corporate 
boards: A review and research agenda. 
Corporate Governance, 17(3), 320-337. 
http://doi.org/10.111
1/j.1467-8683.2009.00742.
[6] Epps, R. W., & Cereola, S. J. (2008). 
Do institutional shareholder services 
(ISS) corporate governance ratings 
reflect a company’s operating 
performance?. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 19(8), 1135-1148.
[7] Leng, A. C. A. (2004), ‘The impact 
of corporate governance practices on 
firms’ financial performance’, ASEAN 
Economic Bulletin, Vol. 21, No. 3, 
pp. 308-18.
[8] Tobin, J. (1969). A general 
equilibrium approach to monetary 
theory. Journal of money, credit and 
banking, 1(1), 15-29.
[9] Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. 
(2003). Board Composition and 
Corporate Performance: How the 
Australian Experience Informs 
Contrasting Theories of Corporate 
Governance. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 11(3), 189-205.
[10] Weir, C., Laing, D., & McKnight, P. 
J. (2002). Internal and External 
Governance Mechanisms: Their Impact 
on the Performance of Large UK Public 
Companies. Journal of Business Finance 
and Accounting, 29(5), 579-611.
[11] Ding, Y., Zhang, H. & Zhang, J. 
(2007) Private versus state ownership 
and earnings management: evidence 
from Chinese listed companies. 
Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 15: 223-238.
[12] Al-Matari, E. M., Al-Swidi, A. K., & 
Fadzil, F. H. B. (2014). The 
measurements of firm performance’s 
dimensions. Asian Journal of Finance & 
Accounting, 6(1), 24-49.
[13] Black, B. S., Jang, H. & Kim,W. 
(2006). ‘Does corporate governance 
predict firms’ market values? Evidence 
from Korea’. Journal of Law, Economics, 
and Organization, 22 (2): 366-413.
[14] Amico, A. (2014). Corporate 
Governance Enforcement in the Middle 
East and North Africa. OECD Corporate 
Governance Working Papers, (15).
[15] Baydoun, N. (2013). Corporate 
governance in five Arabian Gulf 
countries. Managerial Auditing Journal, 
28(1), 7-22.
[16] Amico, A. (2012). The role of 
MENA stock exchanges in corporate 
governance.
[17] IFC, international finance 








Accounting and Finance Innovations
16
[18] Held, D., & Ulrichsen, K. (Eds.). 
(2013). The transformation of the Gulf: 
politics, economics and the global order. 
Routledge.
[19] Nugée, J., & Subacchi, P. (Eds.). 
(2008). The Gulf Region: A New Hub of 
Global Financial Power. Chatham House 
(Formerly Riia).
[20] Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 
(1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial 
behavior, agency costs and ownership 
structure. Journal of financial 
economics, 3(4), 305-360.
[21] Eisenhardt, M. (1986). Agency 
Theory!: and Assessment Review. 
Accounting Management Review, 
14(1), 57-74.
[22] Shabbir, A. & Padgett, C. (2005). 
‘The UK Code of Corporate 
Governance: Link between Compliance 
and Firm Performance’, Working Paper, 
ICMA Centre, available at: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=934313.
[23] Jebran, K., Chen, S., Tauni, M. Z., & 
Ahmad, H. (2019). Corporate 
Governance, ultimate owner, and target 
cash holdings: evidence from China. 
SAGE Open, 9(4), 2158244019894293.
[24] Byrd, J. W., & Hickman, K. A. 
(1992). Do outside directors monitor 
managers?: Evidence from tender offer 
bids. Journal of financial economics, 
32(2), 195-221.
[25] Al-Musalli, M. A. K., & Ismail, K. 
N. I. K. (2012). Corporate governance, 
bank specific characteristics, banking 
industry characteristics, and intellectual 
capital (IC) performance of banks in 
Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries. Asian Academy of 
Management Journal of Accounting and 
Finance, 8(1), 115-135.
[26] Mahadeo, J. D., Soobaroyen, T., & 
Hanuman, V. O. (2012). Board 
composition and financial 
performance:Uncovering the effects of 
diversity in an emerging economy. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 105(3), 
375-388.
[27] Gupta, M., & Fields, L. P. (2009). 
Board independence and corporate 
governance: Evidence from director 
resignations. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 36(1-2), 
161-184.
[28] Ho, C.A. & Williams, S.M. (2003). 
International Comparative Analysis of 
the Association between Board 
Structure and the efficiency of Value 
Added by a Firm from its Physical 
Capital and Intellectual Capital 
Resources. The International Journal of 
Accounting, 38, 465-491.
[29] La Porta, R., LopezSDeSSilanes, F., 
& Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate 
ownership around the world. The 
journal of finance, 54(2), 471-451.
[30] Cruz, C. C., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & 
Becerra, M. (2010). Perceptions of 
benevolence and the design of agency 
contracts: CEO-TMT relationships in 
family firms. Academy of Management 
Journal, 53(1): 69-89.
[31] Kappes, I., & Schmid, T. (2013). The 
effect of family governance on corporate 
time horizons. Corporate Governance 
(Oxford), 21(6), 547-566.
[32] McConaughy, D.L., Matthews, C.H. 
& Fialko, A.S. (2001). Founding-family-
controlled firms: performance risk and 
value. Journal of Small Business 
Management 39(1): 31- 49.
[33] Villalonga, B., & Amit, R.  
(2006). How do family ownership, 
control and management affect firm 
value?.Journal of financial Economics, 
80(2), 385-417.
[34] Gupta, N., (2005). Partial 
privatization and firm performance. 
Journal of Finance 60 (2), 987-1014.
17
The Effect of Internal Corporate Governance of the Firm’s Performance and Firm Value in Five...
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.99909
[35] Liu, G. S. & Sun, S. P. (2005). The 
class of shareholdings and its impacts on 
corporate governance: A case of state 
shareholdings composition in Chinese 
publicly listed companies. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 
13: 46-59.
[36] Sun, Q. & W. Tong (2003), ‘China 
Share Issue Privatization: The Extent of 
its Success’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 70, pp. 182−222.
[37] Wei, Z., Xie, F. & Zhang, S. (2005) 
Ownership structure and firm value in 
China’s privatized firms: 1991-2001, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 40: 87-108.
[38] Larcker, D. F., Richardson, S. a., & 
Tuna, I. (2007). Corporate Governance, 
Accounting Outcomes, and 
Organizational Performance. The 
Accounting Review, 82(4), 963-1008.
[39] Yan, X. & Zhang, Z., (2009). 
Institutional investors and equity 
returns: are short-term institutions 
better informed. The Review of 
Financial Studies, 22(2), 893-924. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/revfin/
hhl046 Notes
[40] Amer, M., Ragab, A., & Shehata, S. 
(2014). Audit Committee Characteristics 
and Firm Performance: Evidence from 
Egyptian Listed Companies. In 6th 
Annual American Business Research 
Conference on Sheraton LaGuardia East 
Hotel, New York, USA.
[41] Kipkoech, S. R. (2016). Audit 
Committee Size, Experience and Firm 
Financial Performance . Evidence 
Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya, 
Research Journal of Finance and 
Accounting. 7(15), 87-95
[42] Charumilind, C., Kali, R., 
Wiwattanakantang, Y., (2006). 
Connected lending: Thailand before the 
financial crisis. Journal of Business 79, 
181-218.
[43] Faccio, M. (2006). Politically 
connected firms. The American 
economic review, 96(1), 369-386.
[44] Fisman, R. (2001). Estimating the 
value of political connections. American 
Economic Review, 91: 1095– 1102.
[45] Johnson, S., & T. Mitton, (2003), 
“Cronyism and Capital Controls: 
Evidence from Malaysia,“Journal of 
Financial Economics, 67, 351-382.
[46] Leuz, C., & Oberholzer-Gee, F. 
(2006). Political relationships, global 
financing, and corporate 
transparency:Evidence from Indonesia. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 81(2), 
411-439.
[47] Siegel, J., (2005). Can foreign firms 
bond themselves effectively by renting 
US securities laws? Journal of Financial 
Economics 75, 319-359.
[48] Van Tendeloo, B. and A. 
Vanstraelen. (2008). Earnings 
Management and Audit Quality in 
Europe: Evidence from the Private 
Client Segment Market. European 
Accounting Review 17 (3): 447-469
[49] Van Tendeloo, B., & Vanstraelen, A. 
(2005). Earnings management under 
German GAAP versus IFRS. European 
Accounting Review, 14(1), 155-180.
[50] Lin, J., & Hwang, M. (2010). Audit 
Quality, Corporate Governance, and 
Earnings Management: A 
MetaAnalysis.i International Journal of 
Auditing. Vol.10. Pp. 1099-1123.
[51] Charles. J., Stanley, C., & Charlotte, 
H. (2010). The Imp act Of Audit Quality 
On Earnings Management to Achieve 
User Reference Points In EPS. Journal of 
Applied Business Research. Vol. 26 
No.1, p19-30
[52] Chen, C. J. P., Chen, S., & Su, X. 
(2005). Profitability Regulation, 
Earnings Management, and Modified 
Accounting and Finance Innovations
18
Audit Opinions: Evidences from China. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory. Vol. 20(2), pp 9-30.
[53] Adams, R. and Ferreira, D. (2009). 
Women in the Boardroom and Their 
Impact on Governance and 
Performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 94(2) 291-309.
[54] Falato, A., Kadyrzhanova, D., & 
Lel, U. (2014). Distracted directors: 
Does board busyness hurt shareholder 
value?. Journal of Financial Economics, 
113(3), 404-426.
[55] Field, L., Lowry, M., & Mkrtchyan, 
A. (2013). Are busy boards 
detrimental?. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 109(1), 63-82.
[56] Smith, N., Smith, V., & Verner, M. 
(2006). Do women in top management 
affect firm performance? A panel study 
of 2,500 Danish firms. International 
Journal of productivity and 
Performance management, 55(7), 
569-593.
[57] Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2006). 
Corporate Governance Structure and 
Performance of Malaysian Listed 
Companies, 33(October), 1034-1062.
[58] Rutledge, R. W., Karim, K. E., & Lu, 
S. (2016). The effects of board 
independence and CEO duality on firm 
performance: evidence from the 
NASDAQ-100 index with controls for 
endogeneity. Journal of Applied 
Business and Economics, 18(2), 49.
[59] Baysinger, B. D., & Butler, H. N. 
(1985). Corporate governance and the 
board of directors: Performance effects 
of changes in board composition. 
Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization, 1(1), 101-124.
[60] De Vuyst, V., & Ooghe, H. (2001). 
Corporate performance and board 
structure in Belgian companies. Long 
range planning, 34(3), 383-398
[61] Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market 
valuation of companies with a small 
board of directors. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 40(2), 185-211.
[62] Agrawal, A.& Knoeber, C. R. 
(1996). Firm performance and mecha- 
nisms to control agency problems 
between managers and share- holders. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 31: 377-397
[63] Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., & Schmid, 
M. M. (2006). An Integrated 
Framework of Corporate Governance 
and Firm Valuation, 12(2), 249-283
[64] Henry, D. (2008). Corporate 
Governance Structure and the Valuation 
of Australian Firms!: Is There Value in 
Ticking the Boxes!?, 35(October), 
912-942.
[65] Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. 
(2003). Corporate governance and 
equity prices. The quarterly journal of 
economics, 118(1), 107-156.
[66] Core, J., Guay, W. & Rusticus, T. 
(2006) Does Weak Governance Cause 
Weak Stock Returns? An Examination 
of Firm Operating Performance and 
Investors’ Expectations, Journal of 
Finance, 61, 2, 655-687.
[67] Cui, T.Q., Evans, E., Wright, S. & 
Crowe, S., (2008). Have the objectives 
of the ASX recommendations on good 
corporate governance been achieved? 
[Online] Working Paper, Macquarie 






[68] Chung, K. H. & Pruitt, S. W. (1994) 
A simple approximation of Tobin’s q, 
Financial Management, 23, 70-74
[69] Copeland, T., & Dolgoff, A. (2011). 
Outperform with expectations-based 
19
The Effect of Internal Corporate Governance of the Firm’s Performance and Firm Value in Five...
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.99909
management: a state-of-the-art approach 
to creating and enhancing shareholder 
value. John Wiley & Sons.
[70] Jang, S., & Park, K. (2011). Inter-
relationship between firm growth and 
profitability. International Journal of 
Hospitality Management, 30, 1027-1035.
[71] Velnampy, T. (2005). A study on 
investment appraisal and profitability. 
Journal of Business Studies, 2(1), 23-35
[72] Amato, L. H., & Burson, T. E. 
(2007). The Effects of firm size on profit 
rates in the financial services. Journal of 
Economics and Economic Education 
Research, 8(1), 67-81.
[73] Al-Hussaini, A., & Al-Sultan, W. 
(2008). DEVELOPMENT OF 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
FOLLOWING ADOPTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS IN THE GULF 
CO-OPERATION COUNCIL MEMBER 
STATES. Journal of International Business 
Strategy, 8(3).
[74] Wang, M. & Huang, M (2014). 
Which types of institutional investors 
constrain abnormal accruals?. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 
22(1), 43-67.
[75] Tabachnick, B. & Fidell, L. (2001) 
Using Multivari- ate Statistics, 3rd edn. 
New York: Harper Collins College.
[76] Bowerman, B. L., & O’connell, R. T. 
(1990). Linear statistical models: An 
applied approach. Brooks/Cole.
[77] Myers, R. H. (1990). Classical and 
modern regression with applica- tions 
(2nd edition). Boston: PWS-Kent.
[78] Alghamdi, S. A. (2012). 
Investigation into Earnings Management 
Practices and the Role of Corporate 
Governance and External Audit in 
Emerging Markets!: Empirical Evidence 
from Saudi Listed Companies.
[79] Choi, J. H., & Wong, T. J. (2007). 
Auditors’ governance functions and 
legal environments: An international 
investigation. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 24(1), 13-46.
[80] Choi, J. H., Kim, J. B., Liu, X., & 
Simunic, D. A. (2008). Audit pricing, 
legal liability regimes, and big 4 
premiums: Theory and cross-country 
evidence. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 25(1), 55-99.
[81] Niskanen, J., Karjalainen, J., 
Niskanen, M., & Karjalainen, J. (2011). 
Auditor gender and corporate earnings 
management behavior in private Finnish 
firms. Managerial Auditing Journal, 
26(9), 778-793.
[82] Rodríguez, M. C., & Alegría, S. S. 
(2012). The value of audit quality in 
public and private companies: evidence 
from Spain. Journal of Management & 
Governance, 16(4), 683-706.
[83] Francis, J. R., & Krishnan, J. (1999). 
Accounting accruals and auditor 
reporting conservatism. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 16(1), 135-165.
[84] Kim, H., Hoskisson, R. E., Tihanyi, 
L., & Hong, J. (2004). The evolution 
and restructuring of diversified 
business groups in emerging markets: 
The lessons from chaebols in Korea. 
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
21(1/2), 25-48.
[85] Wiwanya, T. & Aim, J. (2008). The 
relationship between audit committee 
characteristics, audit firm size and 
earnings management in quarterly 
financial reports of companies listed in 
the stock exchange of Thailand. 8th 
Global Conference on Business & 
Economics, Florence Italy, 18-19th 
October.
[86] Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency 
Problems and the Theory of the Firm. 
Journal of political economy, 
88(2), 288-307
Accounting and Finance Innovations
20
[87] Sonnenfeld, J. A. (2002) What 
Makes Great Boards Great, Harvard 
Business Review, 106-113.
[88] Chhaochharia, V. & Y. Grinstein, 
(2009). CEO Compensation and Board 
Structure. Journal of Finance 64 
(1):231- 261.
[89] Cadbury, A. (1992). Cadbury 
report: The financial aspects of 
corporate governance. Tech reprt, 
HMG, London.
